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Abstract
This introductory essay aims to offer a framework through which to make sense of the 
controversies arising from International Criminal Court (ICC) intervention in Africa. 
One such controversy is related to the deployment of the powers to refer and defer ICC 
cases central to Article 16 of the Rome Statute for the ICC. The manner in which the 
UNSC has employed this power has led critics – particularly on the African continent – 
to conclude that a range of geopolitics has undermined the judicial independence 
of the ICC. The essay argues, therefore, that the drafting history of Article 16 of the 
Rome Statute shows the workings of the political origins of the law and the manner in 
which foundational inequalities were woven into the very fabric of the Rome Statute. 
Following theorists such as Giorgio Agamben and Walter Benjamin who have concep-
tualized law as violence and who have taken seriously the ways in which violence and 
inequality live on through the law, the authors argue that not only can contemporary 
ontologies of international criminal law not escape the politics of its making, but if 
we are to adequately address the conditions of violence in the postcolonial African 
state there must be an ontological shift in the way we conceptualize law. They pro-
pose a rethinking that acknowledges root causes of violence and that take seriously 
politically adumbrated histories of violence that continue live in the armature of the 
postcolonial state. Considering how and when political settlements are relevant and 
rethinking how complementarity and cooperation might work more effectively are 
key to the conceptual framework.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has been constructed by many ICC 
proponents as a relationship ultimately concerned with the maintenance of 
international peace and security. On paper, the ICC is not an organ of the UN. 
In practice, however, various permanent members of the UNSC have sought 
to control the activities of the ICC from its inception. During early stages of 
negotiations to establish the Court, permanent members of the UNSC insisted 
that the activation of the jurisdiction of the Court should be subject to the 
approval of the UN Security Council. A compromise was reached during the 
negotiations for the adoption of the Rome Statute that accommodated both 
the desires of the UNSC and other delegates. But that compromise came with a 
price. The UNSC was given powers to refer non-states parties to the Court under 
Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute and defer cases before the ICC under Article 
16 while acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. These provisions have led 
to significant controversies in ICC relationships with states and regional actors, 
and they have been seen by many critics as having the potential to undermine 
the judicial independence of the ICC.1
One of the emerging challenges has not only involved the seemingly pref-
erential role of the Security Council in exercising its deferral power. It has also 
involved the play of power in which the UNSC has referred some cases and not 
others. Syria is one such example of an instance of UNSC inaction. Over the past 
three years, Syria has been engulfed in a violent conflict with 250 000 besieged 
civilians and a death toll surpassing 100 000. Both government forces and 
non-government armed groups have committed widespread attacks, includ-
ing murder, rape, torture and enforced disappearances. In response, various 
resolutions have been presented to the UNSC to refer the situation to the ICC, 
but have all been vetoed. Of late, 65 UN member states, of which several were 
African states, cosponsored a draft resolution for adoption asking the UNSC to 
refer the situation to the ICC. Once again, this resolution was vetoed by China 
1 K.M. Clarke, unpublished manuscript, 2014. 
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and Russia, prompting questions regarding the play of political interests in the 
dynamic between the UNSC and the ICC. This perception of politically moti-
vated selectivity has highlighted the extent to which the politics of the deci-
sion (Agamben, 1998) is at play and shapes the terms on which the suspension 
of the law is mobilized toward particular ends. This politics of the executive 
decision is far from mundane and continues to be a feature of late modernity, 
manifest in what is known today as the new international order,2 an order 
characterized by the realignment of state sovereignty with greater emphasis 
on state inter-relationships with each other and international institutions.3
As a feature of modernity, the power of the decision, whether exercised 
through domestic constitutional provisions, international tribunals or inter-
national organizations such as the UNSC, has implications for not only under-
standing the workings of state power in our contemporary international 
system but also the workings of the international order, made up of interna-
tional organizations such as the United Nations. While these organizations are 
perceived to be democratic in their representational politics, they are actu-
ally constituted through the maintenance of a particular legal democratic 
order. This order is exemplified by the political compromise reached during 
the negotiations of Article 16 of the Rome Statute and in relation to current 
cases before the ICC. This conceptualization of the democratic order as fun-
damentally shaped by the play of power and not the ability to ensure equal-
ity (between states, in relation to poverty, etc.) calls for the rethinking of the 
potential of the new international order to undermine inequality and produce 
the terms for the absence of violence.4
International law scholarship that has analyzed Article 16-UNSC-ICC issues 
have tended to identify the problem, assess ‘lessons learnt’ and then issue a 
range of recommendations to help reach a solution. For instance, Charles 
Jalloh, Dapo Akande and Max du Plessis have taken up the problem of the 
Article 16 referrals as they relate to the AU, ICC and UNSC and issued a range 
of recommendations from the need to promote more effective cooperation 
and a deeper engagement between ICC States Parties, the ICC and the UNSC 
and the need for the AU and the UN to communicate with one another as per 
the existing protocols, to the need for the expansion of the use of domestic 
2 K.M. Clarke, unpublished manuscript, 2015. 
3 A. Chayes and A. Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International 
Regulatory Agreements (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998). 
4 K.M. Clarke, unpublished manuscript, 2015. 
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mechanisms for ICC crimes.5 Lawrence Moss examines the referral and defer-
ral powers of the UNSC and issues concluding recommendations ranging from 
the establishment of a UNSC working group on referrals, recommending that 
the UNSC work to promote justice and accountability and enhance the deter-
rent effect of the Court.6 Tim Murithi recommends that the AU and the ICC 
“reorient their stances” towards one another, identifies a need for enhanced 
dialogue and engagement, and recommends that a political liaison officer be 
appointed at the ICC to facilitate communication with political organizations 
such as the AU, while Makau Mutua has suggested that the Security Council 
should generally resist using their deferral powers and politicizing the work of 
the ICC.7 By and large, these interventions operate from within the legal frame 
or within the pre-existing structures and procedures of the Rome Statute and 
UN Charter.8 Though we do not discount the relevance of such interventions, 
what this special issue will highlight is the reality that legal reform within the 
contemporary ICC-judicial system or the reorganization of the Security Council 
in favour of a more democratic social order is not all that is missing – at least as 
far as the existence of violence in the postcolonial African state is concerned. 
The reality is that in most of the situations involving overt forms of violence 
against the human body on the African continent, this contemporary violence 
has roots in the formation of the colonial and-or settler state.9 The plunder 
of African resources, the decimation of its peoples and their worldviews, the 
implementation of systems of imperial governance and its designated hierar-
chies of rights-bearing subjects and citizens worked alongside the law and the 
law’s modernity – as we know it.10 But for some scholars and a range of human 
5 D. Akande, M. du Plessis and C.C. Jalloh, Position Paper: An African Expert Study on 
the African Union Concerns about Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the ICC (Institute for 
Security Studies, Pretoria, 2010). 
6 L. Moss, The UN Security Council and the International Criminal Court: Towards a More 
Principled Relationship (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung International Policy Analysis, Berlin, 2012).
7 T. Murithi, The African Court and the International Criminal Court: An Embattled Relationship? 
(Policy Brief No. 8, The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town, 2013); M. Mutua, 
The International Criminal Court in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities, Noref Working 
Paper (September 2010), available online at http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/ 
storage/original/application/d5dc6870a40b79bf7c1304f3befe0b55.pdf (accessed 13 June 2014). 
8 Akande et al., supra note 5, p. 26. 
9 M. Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror (Random House, 
New York, NY, 2009).
10 Ibid. See also A. Anghie, ‘Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International 
Financial Institutions and the Third World’, 32 NYU Journal of International Law and 
Politics (2000), 243–290.
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rights organizations in general, law, and in particular justice, has been concep-
tualized as the opposite of violence.11 For others it has been articulated as a 
form of violence with the potential to exert a performative and self-preserving 
force.12 The foregoing presumes that law is a self-preserving mechanism that – 
through its agents – has the ability to preserve order, re-conceptualize it or 
hide the basis of its power.13 This ability to preserve itself – and indeed, follow-
ing Derrida and Agamben, to preserve and sustain the political powers that 
constitute it – is central to the workings of law.
In much of the Western constitutional law literature the legitimizing foun-
dations of law are presumed to exceed the play of politics. Much of that schol-
arship constructs the continuity of a socio-rational order as being aligned 
with the intentions of the “founding fathers”. The founding intentions – as 
political acts – are often ritualized to legitimate a new social order, after which 
time politics are often understood to be disarticulated from law.14 This per-
ceived tension between the political and the legal is neither new nor unique. 
In the various tensions and contestations between the ICC and the African 
Union, there is a similar division at play between ‘the law’ and ‘politics’, with 
the ICC embodying what is often seen as law and the Security Council char-
acterized as decidedly political, undemocratic and non-transparent in nature. 
Such distinctions are also drawn at the national level, between state institu-
tions that are considered political. This distinction provides the foundation 
for the law to legitimate itself, as a system of neutral rules that stand apart 
from and even above the partisan process, which is seen to be quintessentially 
political. Following Sarah Nouwen and Wouter Werner (2011), the ICC is inher-
ently and inextricably political, in so far as it demarcates friends and enemies. 
They argue that efforts to demarcate law and politics render an analysis of the 
politics of the law impossible.15 Nevertheless, various statements by agents 
of the ICC reflect such an effort to demarcate law and politics. For example, 
11 See Harold Kongju Koh, ‘International Criminal Justice 5.0’ 38 Yale Journal of International 
Law (2014), 525–542.
12 R. Buonamano, ‘The Economy of Violence: Derrida on Law and Justice’, 11(2) Ratio Juris 
(1998), 169–179. 
13 See J. Derrida, ‘Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority’, in Drucilla Cornell, 
Michel Rosenfeld, David Gray Carlson (eds), Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice 
(Psychology Press, Abingdon, 1992); Buonamano, supra note 12; K.M. Clarke, Fictions of 
Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Challenge of Legal Pluralism (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2009).
14 Derrida, supra note 13.
15 S. Nouwen and W. Werner, ‘Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal 
Court in Uganda and Sudan’, 21 European Journal of International Law (2011), 941–965.
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in a 2008 article by the former Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 
“The prosecutor’s duty is to apply the law without bowing to political con-
siderations, and I will not adjust my practices to political considerations. It is 
time for political actors to adjust to the law . . . we have no police and no army 
but we have legitimacy.”16 In an interview in early 2014, current Prosecutor 
Fatou Bensouda insisted that “political and extraneous considerations” played 
no role in the decisions of her office.17 At play, then, is a discourse seeking 
to assert the Court as decidedly apolitical. Law and politics are presented as 
two separate domains, with the ICC operating firmly in the first and with no 
regard for the latter. These claims that the institution is impartial and indepen-
dent and that the decisions of its key agents are guided solely by judicial and 
legal criteria are meant to affirm the credibility and legitimacy of the Court. 
This has been further affirmed by a range of critically engaged scholars. Judith 
Shklar describes efforts to articulate law and politics as two separate domains, 
“Politics . . . regarded not only as something apart from law, but as inferior to 
law. Law aims at justice, while politics look only to expediency. The former 
is neutral and objective, the latter the uncontrolled child of competing inter-
ests and ideologies.”18 Clearly law, and international law in particular, cannot 
escape the politics of its origins and enactment. The idea that law is set up to 
combat political interests and endemic violence highlights the reality that the 
politics of the “founding” violence of law is actually re-inscribed within the 
framework that the law reproduces.
TWAIL (Third World Approaches to International Law) scholars have cri-
tiqued the establishment of the ad-hoc tribunals ICTY and ICTR by the UN 
Security Council, uneasy with the manner in which the Security Council – 
reflecting the opinions of a limited selection of states – is arrogating to itself 
the power to deal with numerous international questions which have been 
the subject of on-going negotiations by the larger international community.19 
They, too, have rejected the notion of international law as divorced from its 
16 L. Moreno-Ocampo, ‘The International Criminal Court: Seeking Global Justice’, 40 Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2008), 215–225.
17 Interview with Fatou Bensouda, New African Magazine (London 28 January 2014), 
available online at http://www.newafricanmagazine.com/index.php?option=com_
k2&view=item&id=1192:interview-with-fatou-bensouda&Itemid=681 (accessed 10 June 
2014). 
18 J.N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 1964), p. 111.
19 A. Anghie and B. Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual 
Responsibility in Internal Conflicts’, 2 Chinese Journal of International Law (2003), 77–103, 
at p. 93.
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social, historical and political context, and advance the view of the law as 
“a crucial site for the production of ideology and the perpetuation of social 
power.”20 These scholars have called for ways of understanding the founding 
origins of violence that have been part of the colonial and imperial tenets of 
international law.21
Similar sentiments have been echoed by a range of political actors – such as 
those engaged in the African Union-ICC pushback. To date, the AU has publi-
cally denounced the ICC as pursuing Western interests and has begun to enter-
tain the possibility of establishing a criminal chamber of the African Court of 
Justice on Human and People’s Rights that will take responsibility for crimes 
committed on the African continent. With the negotiations of a protocol to 
extend the jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ 
Rights to include jurisdiction over international crimes, we see similar delib-
erations: whether it would be desirable for the Peace and Security Council of 
the African Union to play a role in referring cases to the Court for consider-
ation. While some scholars argue that the draft protocol is simply advancing 
the ideals of the ICC and a way of ensuring that there is no impunity in the 
continent through the prosecution of international crimes peculiar to Africa,22 
others argue that the draft protocol is a “laundry basket” of crimes and a proj-
ect that is not feasible and cannot be effectively implemented.23 Additionally, 
there is a critical response to the assumption that the international criminal 
justice architecture with its primary focus on retributive justice is a panacea 
to the myriad developmental problems facing Africa today. Given these recent 
developments, there is a need to re-examine the relationship between the ICC 
and the UNSC, as well as to make sense of the role of the African Union in the 
20 J.T. Gathii, ‘Rejoinder: Twailing International Law’, 98 Michigan Law Review (2000), 2066–
2071, at p. 2066. 
21 See Gathii, supra note 20; O.C. Okafor, ‘Newness, Imperialism, and International Legal 
Reform In Our Time: A TWAIL Perspective’, 43 Osgoode Hall Law Journal (2005), 171–191; 
K. Mickelson, ‘Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal Discourse’, 16 
Wisconsin International Law Journal (1997–1998), 353–420; M. Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL?’, in 
Proceedings of the American Society for International Law (Washington, DC, April 2000), 
Anghie and Chimni, supra note 19; S. Grovogui, ‘Regimes of Sovereignty: Rethinking 
International Morality and the African Condition’, 8 The European Journal of International 
Relations (2002), 315–338.
22 For example, the crime of unconstitutional change of government.
23 A. Abass, ‘Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa: Principles, Issues and Limitations.’ 
Workshop paper presented at The International Criminal Court and the Future of 
International Law in Africa. African Studies working group initiative on International Law 
in Africa, Yale University, 14 September 2012.
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increasing politicization of social inequality in sub-Saharan Africa. This is so 
not just because of the need to understand the play of power, but also through 
the need to rethink how modernity is conceived as well as its manifestation in 
the life of the law.24
The life of the law is based on a modern social order that encapsulates an 
understanding of equality and justice and a discourse of rationality. The ratio-
nal foundations discourse has produced a legal modernity in which a particu-
lar ontological order is at play. Put another way, modernity – and its attendant 
conception of law – privileges a certain way of understanding being or exis-
tence. This ontology has its roots in the rationalization, industrialization and 
institutionalization of a particular philosophy of being that asserts ways of 
knowing that value enlightenment principles such as rationality and progress, 
and it works through institutions, notions of certainty, transparency, and due 
process through the law. In essence, ontology is a particular way of concep-
tualizing being or existence and works through the modernity of the social 
order to structure what kind of presumptions are built into law as a social field. 
When applied to the ontological order of the UNSC as an extension of this 
logic, the reality is that it neither precludes inequality nor presumes equality as 
the basis of its mission. Through its theory of existence it establishes the terms 
in which the law can be mobilized in the defence of the socio-political order. 
For instance, the UNSC has five permanent members, and each of those mem-
bers has veto power. The UN General Assembly also elects ten non-permanent 
members for two-year terms on the Council. In May 2014, thirteen of the fifteen 
Council members supported the resolution to refer the Syrian situation to the 
ICC, but China and Russia exercised veto power to oppose the ICC referral. 
Veto powers in various international organs, such as the UNSC, are a mecha-
nism of assurance in which a particular order is maintained in the name of 
peace and security.
In the ICC relationship with the UNSC, articulating recommendations for 
judicial action alone only represents a mechanism for the reorganization of 
violence – from the physical to the judicial. While the adherence to a Chapter VII 
referral attends to the reality of political considerations in legal action, in many 
of the ICC cases various root causes, ranging from colonial and settler histori-
cal land disenfranchisement, ethnic violence, and plunder emerged from ear-
lier histories of disenfranchisement that, following Mahmood Mamdani and 
Thabo Mbeki, require a range of political settlements.25 The challenge, as we 
24 K.M. Clarke, unpublished manuscript, 2015. 
25 T. Mbeki and M. Mamdani, ‘Courts Can’t End Civil Wars’ The New York Times Opinion 
Pages (5 February 2014).
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will see featured in some of the foregoing articles in this special issue, is that 
decisions regarding the referral of cases to the ICC are driven by actions legible 
to legal temporalities rather than endemic problems at the core of violence.26 
This reality has created a heuristic in which legal action is privileged and dis-
tanced from those considerations seen as political. The themes to be raised 
address vast and complex considerations related to legal norm making. We 
explore the controversies over the management of violence by various political 
actors in Africa and beyond by way of clarifying that the very legal provisions 
intended to be the basis for peace and security are actually representative of 
on-going forms of social inequality that the law was assumed to abrogate.
2 Enduring the Conundrum: The Violence of the Law and Ending 
Violence through Law
Over the past century, approaches to understanding the workings of modern 
law as a form of continued structural and conceptual violence have been wide-
spread and detailed. Among some of the most provocative approaches have 
been those conceptualizations that have returned us to the perceived banality 
of the social order in which violence is understood as being deeply embedded 
in the norms of daily life.27 From Walter Benjamin’s (1921) conceptualization 
of the very laws perceived to be liberatory as the very legal provisions with 
originary powers that result in both the violence of exclusion and the daily 
reinforcement of that violence through policing and other modalities, to Franz 
Fanon’s assertion of violence and not its absence being key to the modernity 
of the settler-native relationship, to Hannah Arendt’s conceptualization of the 
‘banality of evil’ in which some of the most extreme and totalitarian forms of 
violence became gradually embedded in the norms of daily life.28 And it was 
Giorgio Agamben’s later clarification of the way that violence functions through 
law to reinforce its constituent and constituting powers that a vivid clarifica-
tion of the basis for the social order through the juridical was  articulated as 
26 Clarke, supra note 13; K.M. Clarke, unpublished manuscript, 2005. 
27 See D. Thomas, Exceptional Violence: Embodied Citizenship in Transnational Jamaica 
(Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2011).
28 See W. Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, in P. Demetz (ed.), Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, 
Autobiographical Writings (Shocken Books, New York, NY, 1921); F. Fanon, The Wretched of 
the Earth (Grove Press, New York, NY, 1963); H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on 
the Banality of Evil (Viking Press, New York, NY, 1963).
Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2021 07:19:56PM
via Haverford College Library
306 Clarke and Koulen
African Journal of Legal Studies 7 (2014) 297–319
the sovereign right of the decision.29 The power of the decision, of potential-
ity, whether through the ability to exercise veto power, or suspend the social 
order through martial law or executive order was articulated by Agamben 
as being embedded in the space of actuality, of the constituent order of law. 
Here Agamben used the historical Nazi “concentration camp” as an example 
of the mobilization of the law to enforce the power to kill with impunity.30 He 
later invoked the manner in which legal protection and rights were – through 
the US-War on Terror – denied to US Guantanamo Bay detainees through a 
reclassification of their status as ‘enemy combatants’ and not Prisoners of War 
(POWs). As this classification of ‘enemy combatants’ through US executive 
order did not exist as a protected category under international humanitarian 
law, this reclassification placed them outside of the law and denied them the 
legal protection that being classified, as POWs would have offered. It is the real-
ity that the US suspension of the law was operationalized through executive 
order, through an executive decision, – and not through a constitutional judi-
cial protection – that remains central to the originary violence of law in which 
executive action can be deployed to maintain particular ontologies of power. 
All of these theorists note how violence – whether quotidian or exceptional – 
lives on through the work of law, contesting the liberal premise that law seeks 
to contain its excesses. As examples of quotidian and exceptional violence, 
these theorists also show how the law preserves such violence through its con-
stituted order, resulting in the preservation of contemporary law.31 This preser-
vation has produced a particular legal and conceptual inheritance that has had 
implications for the negotiation of law’s relevance. In contemporary Africa the 
law has both produced the terms for a particular modern ontological order as 
well as a space in which particular inequalities are played out.
The goal of this special issue, therefore, is to explore a reconceptualization 
of the political and the potentialities of international law as ways to infuse a 
rethinking of the contemporary social order in Africa. We explore the way 
that a new legal politics can be arrived at not through a simple revision to the 
constitutional democratic order as we know it, but through what Agamben 
referred to as a disarticulation of the contemporary constitutional state. A 
disarticulation of international and domestic law is a separation of particu-
lar constellations of the legal order. Such approaches to disarticulation may 
involve a rethinking of the working of law through a reconceptualization of 
modernity’s foundational origins and, as such, a rethinking of how the law 
29 G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, CA, 1998).
30 Ibid., at p. 95. 
31 K.M. Clarke, unpublished manuscript, 2015. 
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might be deployed as the basis for empowering the postcolonial state. As the 
papers in this issue suggest, in order to make sense of the problem of perceived 
inequality in the ICC’s Africa focus and the adumbrated problem of selectivity 
of referrals, especially those produced by the UNSC, a rethinking of the onto-
logical foundations of the Article 16 compromise is necessary. In keeping with 
twentieth century scholarship that has engaged in bridging the relationships 
between law, modernity, and violence and twenty-first century platforms for 
rethinking its fictions, we suggest that the contemporary national and interna-
tional social order requires a rethinking of the very legal order through which 
we make sense of our world.32 Such a reconceptualization would produce 
the terms through which politically adumbrated histories of conflict can be 
addressed through a range of considerations beginning with political settle-
ments that acknowledge the violent roots of the postcolonial states, in this 
instance in Africa, and that weigh when and how responsibility for that vio-
lence should be parsed. A more equitable space for negotiation must both 
return us to the perceived disarticulation of law from politics as well as bring 
us closer to a new conceptual basis through which to remake law’s ontology.
The special issue boasts four articles that are divided into two sets of con-
versations – those that work within the law to search for solutions to the prob-
lem of violence, and those that examine the workings of legal actors to not 
only explore the constituting power of law but also to make sense of the rein-
forcement of a particular social form that articulates the terms of inequality. 
Through both points of departure, the goal is to call for a  reconceptualization 
32 See Benjamin, supra note 28; Derrida, supra note 13; Arendt, supra note 28; B. Latour, 
The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil d’Etat (Polity Press, Cambridge, 
2009). See also Anghie and Chimni, supra note 19; Grovogui, supra note 21; Mbeki and 
Mamdani, supra note 25; K.M. Clarke, Fictions of Justice: The International Criminal Court 
and the Challenge of Legal Pluralism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2009); S. Kendall, ‘Critical Orientations: A Critique of International Criminal 
Court Practice, in C. Schwöbel (ed.), Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law 
(Routledge, London, 2014); S. Kendall, “UhuRuto” and other Leviathans: The International 
Criminal Court and the Kenyan Political Order’, 7 African Journal of Legal Studies (2014), 
000–000 (this issue); S.N. Grovogui, Beyond Eurocentrism and Anarchy: Memories of 
International Order and Institutions (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2006); S.-J. Koulen, 
“Justice limited by Law?” Exploring the place of Socio-Economic Rights in International 
Criminal Justice through the Lubanga Trial’, Issues in International Criminal Justice, Special 
Volume: The Lubanga Trial: Lessons Learnt (2012) 85–99; A. Branch, Displacing Human 
Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011); 
G. Mukundi, Africa and the ICC: Can a New Prosecutor Bridge the Divide?, Open Society 
Initiative for Southern Africa (March 2012), available online at http://www.osisa.org/
openspace/regional/africa-and-icc-george-mukundi (accessed 24 June 2014).
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of the current potentialities of international law in Africa and beyond in which 
not only are we committed to the workings of law (in its multiple forms) and 
politics to produce a world absent of violence, but we are also committed to 
the realization that if we are going to address violence writ large we need to 
produce the terms for ontological change in the modernity of the law and its 
inheritance. The essays by the two scholars writing from the global North, 
Kendall and Jennings, have highlighted the genealogical contours of the law in 
establishing the basis upon which the founding legitimacy of international law 
was mobilized through political acts that became detached from the politics of 
their making. Those essays offer examples of the ways that particular ontolo-
gies of violence have been preserved through the law. For the two writing from 
the global South, both with significant professional experience in African pol-
icy and governmental circles, the point of departure is the challenge of using 
the same international legal tenets of the Rome Statute for the ICC to reorient 
the basis for legal action and to dictate what form it should take. The issue 
for Tladi and Olugbuo is unambiguously about the extent to which particular 
legal principles are useful in the operationalization of the contemporary post-
colonial state, and if so, which ones, why and who governs the shape of those 
creations? In this light, those writing from the African continent are not posi-
tioning themselves as beneficiaries of law’s violence. Rather, they are engaged 
in the process of clarifying on what terms particular mechanisms might be 
deployed to address the foundational particularities of the contemporary post-
colonial state.
3 Law’s Modernity: The ICC and the Contemporary Social Order
The International Criminal Court (ICC) celebrated the tenth anniversary of its 
existence in July 2012 and just months prior – on 15 May 2012, Fatou Bensouda 
from The Gambia was sworn into a nine-year term as the Chief Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Court. The ICC is a permanent court that operates 
on the principle of complementarity, which means that states have primary 
jurisdiction over offences committed by their national citizens or over crimes 
committed on their territories. And if a state is ‘unwilling or unable genuinely’ 
to prosecute their nationals, the ICC can make a case to claim jurisdiction over 
the punishment of such offenses. In this regard, the ICC has been celebrated 
by some as the missing link in international justice;33 but among others it rep-
33 K. Annan, Address to the opening plenary of the Preparatory Commission to the 
International Criminal Court (1999), available online at http://www.ngos.net/un/icc.html.
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resents the play of selective politics in the international sphere. Supporters 
have argued that the presence of the ICC serves as a deterrent to would-be 
dictators and their collaborators and that it will help in ending impunity for 
gross human rights violations.34 For these advocates, the active docket of the 
ICC is a sign that it is having the desired impact in the world. Among its critics, 
the ICC is seen as targeting African cases, thereby regionalizing international 
justice in the African continent. There are currently 21 cases in 8 situations 
before the ICC, all of them African situation countries. Of these cases four were 
constituted through self-referrals, two were initiated through the Prosecutor’s 
proprio muto powers, and two – the situation in Darfur (2005) and the situation 
in Libya (2011) were initiated through the UNSC’s referral power.
African states appeared to have initially embraced the ICC as an effective 
way of redressing mass crimes on the continent and Senegal was the first coun-
try in the world to sign the Rome Statute. Today 33 out of 54 members of the 
AU are States Parties to the ICC – more than any other continent. The con-
centration of the ICC’s cases in Africa and the role of the UNSC in pursuing 
interventions have resulted in criticism about the interplay between law and 
politics and the inequalities related to the way that prosecutorial and judicial 
discretion is being exercised in various African cases in which violence is on-
going or peace agreements are being negotiated. The ICC’s interventions in 
Uganda and Sudan in the midst of peace talks were seen by some as another 
example of bodies external to Africa obstructing an internal peace and recon-
ciliation process.
The fallout from these cases led to serious conflicts between the ICC and the 
AU – Africa’s regional body responsible for peace, security, growth and devel-
opment in the region. Central to the tension has been the indictment of sit-
ting President Al Bashir of Sudan. The AU requested that the Security Council 
of the UN defer the indictment of President Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan so that 
peace negotiations could be negotiated in the region. This request was not 
acted upon by the Security Council and resulted in the decision by the AU to 
not cooperate with the ICC in his arrest and surrender to The Hague. This non-
cooperation has created suspicion and lack of trust between the ICC and the AU 
in fighting impunity on the continent. A 2013 decision issued by the Assembly 
of the African Union, stated “There is a need for international justice to be 
conducted in a transparent and fair manner, in order to avoid any perception 
34 R. Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law 
Regime (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005). 
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of double standard, in conformity with the principles of  international law.”35 
Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, at the inauguration of ICC indictee and 
Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, depicted the ICC as ‘individuals engaged 
in legal gymnastics in a far off land.’ Various observers have pointed to per-
ceived double standards in which cases are brought to trial and which are not, 
a lack of transparency and predictability in OTP decisions and express concern 
that “external political and strategic interests have biased the ICC’s judicial 
interventions.”36 Much of the suspicion centres around the ‘democratic deficit’ 
of the Security Council, with only five veto-wielding permanent members (the 
P5), and with the role of the executive in judicial decision-making. This suspi-
cion is further compounded by the fact that several of these P5 members are 
not States Parties to the Rome Statute and are thus not bound by the obliga-
tions set out therein, yet have the power to bring other non-state parties within 
the scrutiny of the Court.
4 Violence through Law: The Sovereign Right of the Decision
The situation in Libya was referred to the ICC by the Security Council in 
February 2011, pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1970, and the Prosecutor opened an 
examination days later.37 In contrast, the situation in Syria – in which 250 000 
civilians have been subjected to siege warfare by government forces – has still 
not been referred to the ICC while the crisis (as of publication in 2014) is in its 
third year. Despite the reports by the Independent International Commission 
of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, finding that crimes against humanity 
have been committed by the Syrian government, that war crimes have been 
committed by both parties to the conflict, and that the Security Council must 
seek a “referral to justice”, on 22 May 2014 a draft Security Council resolution 
referring the situation to the ICC for investigation was vetoed for the fourth 
time by Russia and China, even as more than 60 countries supported the 
35 African Union, ‘Decision on International Jurisdiction, Justice and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC)’ May 2013. Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XXI) In Decisions, Declarations 
and Resolutions of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, 
May 2013. 
36 A. Tiemessen, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Politics of Prosecutions’, The 
International Journal of Human Rights (2014), in press, DOI:10.1080/13642987.2014.901310. 
See also K. Ambos, ‘ICC OTP Report on the Situation in Colombia – A Critical Analysis’ 
(1 February 2014), available online at http://www.ejiltalk.org/icc-otp-report-on-the-
situation-in-colombia-a-critical-analysis/ (accessed 12 June 2014). 
37 UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/Res/1970.
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measure.38 A common critique has become ‘why Libya and not Syria?’, with 
explanations often sought in the political and strategic interests of two P5 
members of the Security Council.39 At play here is the sovereign right of the 
decision, and the monopoly of particular states to decide based on interests 
not necessarily central to the elimination of violence.40
The examples are myriad. In 2006 the OTP decided that the alleged crimes 
committed in Iraq did not meet the requisite ‘gravity threshold’.41 In addition, 
the ‘gravity threshold’ has been applied within a given situation and used to 
justify the prosecution of actors on one side of a given conflict and not the 
other. For instance, in the Uganda situation cases have been brought against 
the rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) but not against government 
forces, with the Prosecutor maintaining that the crimes allegedly commit-
ted by government forces were relatively less grave.42 Carl Schmitt had long 
argued that ‘indeterminate clauses’ are central to juridical life.43 Such clauses 
leave open spaces for judicial clarification – often framed as neutral forms of 
clarification.
38 I. Black, ‘Russia and China veto UN move to refer Syria to international criminal court’ 
Guardian (22 May 2014). See also United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights 
Council, ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic’ (12 February 2014), A/HRC/25/65. 
39 Amnesty International, ‘UN: Russian and Chinese vetoes of Syria ICC resolution “callous” ’, 
press release 22 May 2014, available online at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/
un-russian-chinese-vetoes-syria-icc-resolution-callous-2014-05-22 (accessed 10 June 2014). 
See also Mukundi, supra note 32.
40 Agamben, supra note 29, at p. 17.
41 In May 2014 the OTP announced that it had received further information and that the 
preliminary examination into war crimes involving systematic detainee abuse in Iraq 
from 2003 until 2008 would be re-opened. See International Criminal Court, ‘Prosecutor 
of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, re-opens the preliminary examination 
of the situation in Iraq’, press release 13 May 2014, available online at http://www.icc-cpi 
.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/pages/otp-statement-
iraq-13-05-2014.aspx (accessed 1 June 2014). 
42 See A. Tiemessen, ‘Defying Gravity: Seeking Political Balance in ICC Prosecutions’, blog 
post (22 April 2013), available online at http://justiceinconflict.org/2013/04/22/defying-
gravity-seeking-political-balance-in-icc-prosecutions/ (accessed 1 June 2014); Interna-
tional Criminal Court, Statement by Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 14 October 
2005, available online at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/2919856F-03E0-403F-A1A8-
D61D4F350A20/277305/Uganda_LMO_Speech_141020091.pdf (accessed 14 June 2014). 
43 C. Schmitt, State, Movement, People: The Triadic Structure of the Political Unity, 1933: The 
Question of Legality 1950 (Plutarch Press, Washington, DC, January 2001).
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‘Gravity’ is presented in ICC discourse as a neutral legal criterion, a judicial 
rule that requires simple application, yet it is not defined within the Rome 
Statute. OTP policy papers indicate that when assessing ‘gravity’ the office con-
siders the alleged scale of the crimes, the severity of the crimes, the systematic 
nature of the crimes, the manner in which they were committed, and their 
impact on victims.44 As William Schabas writes, “The gravity language strikes 
the observer as little more than obfuscation, a laboured attempt to make the 
determinations more judicial than they really are . . . They have undoubtedly 
convinced themselves that they have found a legalistic formula to do the 
impossible, namely, to take a political decision while making it look judicial.”45
This reality that legal decisions emerge from political decisions reflects not 
only the play of sovereign decision-making, but also the accommodations 
for judicial rule provided by the spaces of neutrality provided by ‘indetermi-
nate clauses’. In the case of the political struggle over the UNSC referral to the 
ICC with respect to crimes committed on the territory of Egypt since 1 June 
2013, on 25 April 2014, after receiving communications from lawyers repre-
senting Egypt’s Freedom and Justice Party and representing former President 
Dr. Mohamed Morsi, the Office of the Prosecutor decided that the complaint 
could not proceed. In a May 2014 statement on the issue, the OTP explained that, 
legally, the applicants lacked standing to seize the jurisdiction of the Court, as 
Dr. Mohamed Morsi – who had been ousted by a coup in 2013 – was no longer 
recognized as the Egyptian head of state. In addition, the Office concluded 
that the allegations contained in the complaint fell outside of the territorial 
and personal jurisdiction of the Court.46 On the same date, the Prosecutor had 
decided to open a preliminary investigation after receiving a declaration from 
the government of Ukraine accepting the jurisdiction of the Court over alleged 
crimes committed on its territory from 21 November 2013 to 22 February 2014. 
The lawyers handling the Egyptian complaint were outraged by the decision, 
issuing the following statement: “The paradoxical positions taken about the 
44 International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Preliminary 
Examinations (November 2013), available online at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/
icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Documents/OTP%20Preliminary%20
Examinations/OTP%20-%20Policy%20Paper%20Preliminary%20Examinations%20%20
2013.pdf (accessed 1 June 2014). 
45 W. Schabas, Unimaginable Atrocities: Justice, Politics and Rights at the War Crimes Tribunals 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012), 89. 
46 International Criminal Court, The determination of the office of the Prosecutor on the 
communication received in relation to Egypt, press release (8 May 2014, available online at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/
pr1003.aspx (accessed 14 June 2014).
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two situations appear to suggest the process used by the Prosecutor to deter-
mine the similar complaints was at best seriously flawed and at worst inappro-
priately politically motivated.”47
The KC’s Office of the Prosecutor has consistently offered legal or pseudo-
legal explanations couched in the Rome Statute framework to explain its deci-
sions. But clearly, these decisions also deal with intensely political questions 
related to issues of responsibility and democratic legitimacy, i.e., what consti-
tutes a grave crime, what constitutes a state, who may issue complaints and 
speak on behalf of a state, who is the rightful governing authority. Such ques-
tions have particularly played out in relation to Palestine.
In early 2009, Ali Khashan acting as Minister of Justice of the Government 
of Palestine lodged a declaration pursuant to Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, 
accepting the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court for acts committed on the 
territory of Palestine since 1 July 2002. A key issue, of course, was whether 
Palestine qualified as a state and could thus accede to the Rome Statute. 
The OTP concluded in April 2012 that the Palestinian request was not valid 
due to Palestine’s unclear status and that this was a matter for the UN 
Secretary General, and by extension the UN General Assembly, to resolve.48 In 
November 2012, Palestine’s status within the General Assembly became ‘non-
member state observer’, opening the way for Palestine to accede to the Rome 
Statute and seize the jurisdiction of the Court. As political negotiations with 
Israel – brokered by the United States – were on-going over 2013 and early 2014, 
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abass had resolved not to seek accession to 
the Rome Statute during this period. In May 2014, a group of 17 Palestinian and 
international human rights organizations wrote a letter to President Abass, 
urging him to withstand political pressure from Israel, the US, France, the 
United Kingdom, Italy and Canada not to accede to the International Criminal 
Court and to resist these efforts to “politicize justice for victims of serious 
crimes under international criminal law.”49
47 ‘ICC complaint will continue despite Prosecutor’s “wrong” decision’, Middle East Monitor 
(1 May 2014), available online at https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/europe/11222-
icc-complaint-will-continue-despite-prosecutors-wrong-decision (accessed 1 June 2014).
48 International Criminal Court, Situation in Palestine, report available online at http://
www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9B651B80-EC43-4945-BF5A-FAFF5F334B92/284387/
SituationinPalestine030412ENG.pdf (accessed 1 June 2014). 
49 ‘Joint Letter to President Abass on the International Criminal Court’ (8 May 2014), 
available online at http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/08/joint-letter-president-abbas-
international-criminal-court (accessed 1 June 2014). 
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As the above review has made visible, at issue is not a distinction between 
law and politics or efforts to distil law from politics, but rather both the very 
political origins of law and the spaces of indeterminacy within which law 
actually operates. This space of indeterminacy provides an opening for certain 
decisions to be operationalized by the power of the P5 and relevant “strong 
states”. It provides the possibility for the originary ontologies of modern power 
to be negotiated in the name of the law. Such dynamics are visible when one 
analyses the negotiating politics present in the production of the drafting of 
the Rome Statute and the inclusion of Article 16 in particular and the legal 
questions related to the ICC’s exercise of authority. Ultimately, the ICC’s dis-
avowal of jurisdiction over crimes committed in Palestine and Israel was tied 
to the political non-recognition of Palestinian statehood. The decision to base 
the exercise of jurisdiction on the particularities of state recognition precluded 
the ICC’s jurisdiction, leaving the P5 and various strong states and personalities 
in the region to be the arbiters of its future.50 In cases where statehood is rec-
ognized, the Article 16 provision has allowed the UNSC – through its executive 
decision-making – to carve out a space from which the decision to suspend or 
to engage the work of the ICC can be taken on by the prosecutor of the court.
5 The ICC, The UNSC and the Management of Africa’s Violence
In ‘Critique of Violence’ Walter Benjamin outlined a theory of violence that 
both articulated violence in relation to acts of power with an ability to ‘extort’ 
action and in relation to the distinction between law-making violence, law-
preserving violence and law-destroying violence. This approach to violence and 
its management ranged from a conceptualization that involved both action 
and inaction, overt attacks against the body and the place of formal and infor-
mal norm making as the basis for constituting the modern socio-legal order. 
By articulating the manifestation of contemporary law – its originary goals, 
its logic, its preferential practices – as a form of violence, what Benjamin was 
addressing were both the constituent and constituting powers of the sovereign 
state that Giorgio Agamben went on to clarify later in his work as the force of 
law.51 What we see at play with the nature of ICC cases and the special powers 
accorded the UNSC is an example of the operationalization of the force of law 
and the foundational inequalities in the decision-making process. Nowhere is 
there a better example of the schism between the principles of democracy and 
50 International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 48.
51 Agamben, supra note 29.
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equality and the workings of power as that of international law-making circles 
in which the UNSC is central to the preservation of the modern contempo-
rary order and political inequalities have become normalized through law, as 
shown by the Article 16 provision. Article 16 of the Rome Statute provides the 
Security Council with the power to defer cases before the ICC for a renewable, 
one-year period. A deferral of ICC jurisdiction requires approval of nine of the 
15 Council members and no veto by the P5 members.52 A review of the drafting 
history of this particular article makes clear that the provision, now crystallized 
in law, required significant political negotiation and ultimately, compromise. 
The compromise reached was one which recognized the role of the Security 
Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, but sought 
to avoid what was thought to be undue interference in the workings of the 
Court.53 A deferral of ICC jurisdiction requires the approval of nine of the 15 
Council members and no veto by the P5 members.54 The drafting history of the 
Rome Statute, which resulted in a considerable role for the UNSC, illustrates 
the political origins of the law and the manner in which foundational inequali-
ties are woven into the very fabric of the Rome Statute. Once the founding 
negotiations are concluded, and the text approved, a provision transitions into 
the force of law. A rupture is presumed to take place, which erases the various 
inequalities from the political negotiations, and a new domain for reconstitut-
ing the legal as non-political is born.
The four essays in this volume each take up central questions concerning 
law, power, and politics in relation to ICC processes and the challenge over sov-
ereign decision-making, public protest, as well as the various ways that states 
mobilize cooperative or non-cooperative options in the pursuit of law-making. 
The first two essays by Kendall and Jennings highlight the ontological basis by 
which agents of international criminal law have claimed its power. In her con-
tribution, Kendall, international law professor writing from a deconstructivist 
framework in Europe, conducts a case study of the effects produced through 
the ICC intervention in the Kenyan situation – related to prosecuting those 
most responsible for the post-election violence which swept through particu-
lar coastal areas, the slums of Nairobi and the Rift Valley in late 2007 and early 
2008. She illustrates the various effects – both material and discursive – of this 
“international judicial intervention” in the domestic arena. In her article, she 
52 Akande et al., supra note 5, p. 16.
53 S. Kim, ‘Maintaining the Independence of the International Criminal Court: The legal 
and procedural implications of an Article 16 deferral request’, Año XVIII, 29 Agenda 
Internacional (2011) 179.
54 Akande et al., supra note 5, p. 16.
Downloaded from Brill.com09/01/2021 07:19:56PM
via Haverford College Library
316 Clarke and Koulen
African Journal of Legal Studies 7 (2014) 297–319
takes up “the theoretical construction of international criminal law as a collec-
tive project of the international community devoid of political interests and 
embracing the moral call to ‘end impunity’ ”, and contrasts this with the field’s 
work in practice, arguing that contrary to what is imagined, international judi-
cial interventions are in reality infused with selectivity and political consider-
ations. In discussing examples from Kenya, she makes visible how the Court’s 
intervention – far from being a neutral or objective intervention – has had the 
power to produce identities and narratives that in turn yield new sites of politi-
cal contestation. Through this move she demonstrates how ICC legal actors 
have operationalized the space of indeterminate social action through which 
to exercise legal decisions, and how various public officials have counter-
mobilized to produce new terms for social engagement with international law.
Ronald Jennings, legal scholar and anthropologist at Stanford University in 
the United States, uses the establishment of the ICTY and the seeming break 
from the political to the legal process in order to demonstrate how the idea 
of international criminal intervention as a cosmopolitan norm has implica-
tions for the global constitutional order. This essay advances the argument that 
the development of international criminal law and the concomitant notion 
of individual criminal accountability reflect a profound realignment of the 
contemporary order. Jennings takes issue with the dominant view of interna-
tional criminal law as simply another international legal subjectivity operating 
alongside others – such as the system of treaty agreements between sovereign 
states on the basis of reciprocity. Rather, he argues that what he calls ‘cosmo-
politan law’ is ontologically distinct and reflects an underrated departure from 
previous centuries of legal opinion which considered the sovereign state to be 
the sole subject and object of international law and sovereign power as the sole 
constitutional basis for law-making. In this manner, Jennings makes visible the 
power of the decision, and the ways in which political decisions lead to legal 
decisions – even legal decisions that potentially dissolve or undermine the 
very basis of that political power (i.e., the sovereign state). Describing not just 
the originary moment of international criminal law, i.e., the Security Council 
resolution to establish the ICTY in 1993, and the subsequent creation of an 
entire international juridical system, Jennings also takes up the remarkable 
roles played by particular, well-placed individuals as drivers of this and sub-
sequent decisions and enactments. By revisiting a key moment and key play-
ers in the genealogy of international criminal law, he makes clear that what 
may seem to be a unremarkable statutory enactment – i.e., a Security Council 
resolution – was in effect a radical paradigm-shift, but that this rupture went 
largely unrecognized and was further normalized by the precedent-setting 
nature of the law.
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The second and third essays, by Olugbuo and Tladi, respectively, detail the 
way that state actors use the law to intervene through the retraction of coop-
eration or the undermining of the ICC legal order through its replacement with 
an African Court. Writing from the experience of both former state legal advi-
sor and professor of international law in South Africa, Tladi discusses the ten-
sion between the African Union and the ICC, taking the role of the Security 
Council in ICC referrals and deferrals of cases as a key element of this tension. 
Critics of the involvement of the ICC in referring cases to the ICC have pointed 
out that the Security Council is a political body, with a political mandate, and 
as such, may undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the ICC as an inde-
pendent judicial institution. In his analysis, cooperation of States Parties to 
the Rome Statute – as established in Article 86 of the Rome Statute, which 
obligates states to “cooperation fully with the Court in its investigations and 
the prosecution of Rome Statute crimes” – is essential to the success of the 
ICC, and it is cooperation that suffers from the fraught relationships between 
the ICC, the African Union and the Security Council. He takes the relationship 
between these three institutions as a “triangle of conflictual relationships” and 
illustrates how cooperation, or rather the lack of thereof, “is both used as a 
tool to achieve political objectives and also suffers as a victim of the postur-
ing” to the ultimate detriment and “impoverishment” as the author argues, 
of international criminal justice. In Tladi’s argument, cooperation has been a 
victim of a tug of war between the key players. He maps the various political 
sensitivities at play – the reasons why the AU has issued decisions on non-
cooperation and the SC passing of narrow resolutions or its unwillingness to 
fund investigations – and argues that legal processes – such as effective inves-
tigations, or the obligation to cooperate, the objectives of the Rome Statute to 
end impunity and ensure accountability – have become victims to these politi-
cal processes, similar to the well-known African proverb, “When elephants 
fight, it is the grass that suffers.” In this analysis he demonstrates that both 
the metaphorical elephants and grass are central to the working of interna-
tional law. Ultimately, and in an interest to parse when international law could 
be operationalized toward effective ends, he insists that negotiations that lead 
to the leveraging of cooperation (or its withdrawal) can serve as a force for 
political action, allowing a space for it to be mobilized toward particular pro-
gressive ends.
Benson Olugbuo, scholar of international criminal law with a Non-
governmental Organization (NGO) background, writing from the University 
of Cape Town, similarly explores AU-ICC tensions, or as he categorises it, “AU 
misunderstandings with the ICC”, and examines the relationship between the 
Security Council, the ICC and the AU. Olugbuo identifies roles for each of these 
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organizations in the overall maintenance of international peace and security 
and develops policy recommendations to improve the working relationship 
between the ICC and the African Union – taking as a central objective burden 
sharing and the effective cooperation between these institutions. He ends with 
a series of recommendations to provide for burden-sharing and effective coop-
eration between the Security Council, the ICC and the AU.
The four articles speak to each other in their ability to either trace ontolo-
gies of the modern order or embed law within it as the basis for legal reform. 
They take stock of ‘the political’ in international criminal law, whether by 
reviewing the tense relationships between political organs such as the UNSC 
or the AU, examining the political constituency involved in law-making, or by 
exploring the effects of an international judicial intervention in the domestic 
political arena. Benson and Tladi similarly take the Security Council’s involve-
ment in ICC prosecutions as a key point of tension and both depart from an 
understanding that the law should be protected from politics, with the law cast 
as the ‘grass’ easily ‘trampled’ by the power play of politics. Discernable within 
both pieces is a sense of dismay that the judicial process has been thwarted by 
political posturing. In contrast, the pieces by Kendall and Jennings illustrate 
that that which is political and that which is legal may not be so easily sepa-
rated. In her case study, Sara Kendall illustrates how the judicial intervention 
has significantly altered the political realities on the ground, while Jennings 
outlines how with the establishment of the ICTY in 1993, the Security Council 
gained law-making power, leading to the establishment of an entire legal sys-
tem (i.e., the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence) without reference to sov-
ereignty as the constitutional basis that had previously dominated the law. The 
approaches taken in the articles in this special issue are consistent with the 
divide in the political and intellectual stakes in the field. A productive space of 
engagement is the space in between engaged action and scholarly analysis in 
which the political can be reconceptualised through new ontologies for defin-
ing the law’s work.
This collection of essays clarifies that law is about the establishment of a 
social order, and social norms – whether formalized or not. As a manifestation 
of originary design, it exists through force, coercion, and through mundane 
forms of practice and serves as a mechanism of social control. In recogniz-
ing the precarious constitution of law as deeply political, we take seriously the 
contemporary crisis in the social order by mapping some of the considerations 
at the root of legal inequality. The issue offers ways to rethink the workings of 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute and the ontological basis for the law’s power. 
Through these insights we aim to offer a critical lens through which to make 
sense of the presence of the ICC in Africa and Africa’s socio-legal and popular 
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engagement with the ICC and its international partners, including the UNSC. 
But we insist that such an analysis cannot happen without embedding the 
discussion in the ontological logics of legal drafting histories, the production, 
enactment and application of the law as the domains of sovereign decision-
making, as well as the reality of the workings of the international order. These 
processes are part of the play of power and have real consequences for the 
workings of democracy and equality in contemporary life. Foregrounding the 
play of power and strategies for rethinking its manifestation – especially in 
contemporary postcolonial Africa – involves the recognition that particular 
histories have contributed to the founding violence of law’s history in colonial 
Africa. In this light, the essays both deconstruct the problem of the law and 
search for ways that legitimately functioning institutions can be reconceptual-
ised to reflect new ontologies of law’s potential.
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